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LIST OF PARTIES
(A) Edwin F- Guyon (plaintiff) - an attorney licensed to
practice law in the state of Utah*
(B) Fibro Trust (defendant) - a trust doing business in
the state of Utah through its agent Donald H. Pickett and George
Badger, a twice convicted federal felon (pp.72-79).
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The court of appeals has jurisdiction of this action
pursuant to the provisions of sec. 78-2a-2(d), Utah Code Annotated
and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether

the circuit court

abused

failing to grant defendants motion to set

its discretion

in

aside the default

judgment herein rendered.
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) m i s t a k e ,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment. . . . A motion under this Subdivision
<b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a court order denying defendants
motion to set aside a default judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Prior to May 14, 1991, plaintiff, subsequent to

negotiation with George Badger, agreed to provide certain legal
services for and on behalf of George Badger, Leasing Technology
Incorporated, and Fibro Trust at the rate of $100 per hour plus
1

costs and expenses with

the provision

that, should there be a

failure to timely pay said billings, additional services would be
billed at the rate of $150 per hour* (pp. 25, 49)
2.

In response to the below referenced bi 1 1 ings certain

payments were made, save and except for those outstanding at the
time of the filing of the complaint herein, (pp. 25, 49)
3.

On

October

26,

1991,

pursuant

to

instructions

received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for
legal

services

rendered

to

Mr*

Philip

Johnson,

c/o

Leasing

Technology, Inc., 50 West Broadway, #1000, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84101. (exhibit A) (pp. 25, 31-32, 49)
4.

On

February

14, 1992, pursuant

to

instructions

received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for
legal

services

rendered

to

Mr.

Philip

Johnson,

c/o

Leasing

Technology, Inc., 50 West Broadway, #1000, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84101.

(exhibit B) (pp. 26, 33-35, 49)
5.

from

George

On May 8, 1992, pursuant to instructions received
Badger,

plaintiff

submitted

a billing

for

legal

services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84103.
6.
from

George

(exhibit C) (pp. 26, 36-37, 49)
On July 6, 1992, pursuant to instructions received
Badger,

plaintiff

submitted

a billing

for

legal

services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84103.
7.

(exhibit D) (pp. 26, 38, 49)
On

October

20,

1992,

pursuant

to

instructions

received from George Badger, plaintiff submitted a billing for
2

legal services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84103.
8*
received

On

(exhibit E) (pp. 26, 39, 49)
November

3,

1992,

from George Badger, plaintiff

pursuant

to

instructions

forwarded notice of the

continued failure to make payment for legal services rendered and
notice of withdrawal from pending litigation to George Badger, 550
Northmont, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84103.

(exhibit F) (pp. 26, 40-

41, 49)
9.
received

from

On

November

George

13,

Badger,

1992, pursuant
plaintiff

to

submitted

instructions
information

regarding status of current litigation and submitted a billing for
legal services rendered to George Badger, 550 Northmont, Salt Lake
City, Utah. 84103.
10.

On

(exhibit G) (pp. 26, 42-44, 49 and 18-20, 48)
November

20,

1992 George

Badger

forwarded a

letter to plaintiff indicating the existence of "misunderstandings"
regarding the payment of fees for legal services rendered, (exhibit
H) (pp. 27, 45, 49 and 21, 48)
11.

On November 25, 1992 plaintiff

filed the instant

action seeking payment for legal services rendered and for which
payment had not been received, (pp. 27, 1)
12.

On

November

28,

1992 defendant

was

served with

summons and complaint, (pp. 27, 2)
13.

On December 8, 1992 defendant forwarded a letter to

plaintiff stating defendants position regarding the payment of
legal fees for services rendered.
14.

On December

(exhibit I) (pp. 27, 46, 49)

29, 1992, based upon

3

the failure of

defendant

to

answer

plaintiff's

complaint,

the

court

entered

judgment in favor of plaintiff, (p. 5)
15.

On February 17, 1993, plaintiff became aware said

judgment had been entered and forwarded to defendant a notice of
judgment and affidavit of costs, (pp. 6, 7)
16.

On

February

23,

1993

defendant

forwarded

to

plaintiff its motion to set aside default judgment and accompanying
memorandum. Said motion/memorandum does not set forth specific and
sufficiently detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted
in a judgment different from the one entered, (p. 9ff)
17.

On April

6,

1993, and subsequent

to notice

and

hearing, the circuit court entered its order denying defendant's
motion to set aside default judgment. <p. 56)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion

to set

aside

the default

judgment

rendered

herein.
Defendant does not demonstrate upon the record any of the
following:
A.
good cause to set aside entry of default
or default judgment;
B.
a defense of at least ostensible merit to
justify trial on the issues;
C.
mistake,
inadvertence,
surprise,
or
excusable neglect;
D.
that illness alone is a sufficient excuse
to set aside a default judgment; or
E.
lack of indifference or diligence in
pursing the opportunity to defendant the action.
as contemplated by the statutes and cases herein cited.
ARGUMENT
4

1.

Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that:
For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with
Rule 60(b). [emphasis added]
2.

A party seeking to set aside a default judgment must

proffer a defense of at least ostensible merit to justify a trial
on the issues*

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d

507 (Utah 1976).
3.

Rule

60(b)(1),

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

provides that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) m i s t a k e ,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment. . . . A motion under this Subdivision
(b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend
its operation.
4.

It

is

discretionary

with

the

trial

court

to

determine whether movant shows, "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect". Larsen v. Col 1ina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
5.
neglect

in

Illness alone
failing

is not a sufficient excuse to make

to defend

a cause

vacating even a default judgment.

of

action

a ground

for

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260

P.2d 741 (Utah 1984).
6.

Sustaining

a

default

judgment

is

proper

where

statements and/or actions of defendant demonstrate indifference and
lack of diligence in pursuing the opportunity to defend and action.
Russel1 v. Martel1. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).

5

7.
a defendant

In order to obtain relief from a default judgment,
must

show not

only

that

the judgment

was entered

through a reason specified in Rule 60(b), but also the existence of
a meritorious defense.
one which

sets

forth

A meritorious defense is defined as being
specific

and sufficiently

detailed

facts

which, if prove, would have resulted in a judgment different from
the one entered*

State ex r e L

Utah State Department of Social

Services v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983).
CONCLUSIONS
Defendant Fibro Trust's appeal should be dismissed with
prejudice and the judgment and orders entered by the third circuit
court should be affirmed for the following reasons:
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant's motion

to set

aside

the default

judgment

rendered

herein.
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the judgment
entered December 29, 1992 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) on the grounds
of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Defendant is not entitled to relief from the judgment
entered December 29, 1992 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7).
Defendant

is not entitled to relief from the judgment

entered August 27, 1992 pursuant

to its Rule 60(b) claim of ill

health alleged on behalf defendant trust's agent.
Defendant

has

not

presented

facts

sufficient

to

demonstrate a meritorious defense and is not entitled to relief
from the judgment herein entered.
6

Dated t h e

25th

day of

October

, 1993.

^ g s ^ y
Gil/yon, p l a i n t i ^ / a p p e l lee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the above date I hand-delivered
an

original

and

plaintiff/appellee

eight
to

<8>

copies

the clerk

of

of
the

the

foregoing

court

of

brief

appeals,

of
400

Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102 and
two <2> copies were mailed to Mitchell R. Barker, Esq., 349 East
200 South, #170, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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